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Abstract. This paper discusses the problem of stability of equilibrium
points in normal form games in the tremling-hand framework. An equilib-
rium point is called perﬀect if it is stable against at least one seqence of
trembles approaching zero. A strictly perfect equilibrium point is stable
against every such sequence.
We give a suﬃcient condition for a Nash equilibrium point to be strictly
perfect in terms of the primitive characteristics of the game (payoﬀs and
strategies), which is new and not known in the literature. In particular,
we show that continuity of the best response correspondence (which can
be stated in terms of the primitives of the game) implies strict perfectness;
we prove a number of other useful theorems regarding the structure of best
responce correspondence in normal form games.
JEL classiﬁcation: C7
Keywords: Strictly perfect equilibrium, best responce correspondence, unit
simplex, face of a unit simplex.
1. Introduction
The idea of an equilibrium is central in the game theory, for it is an expression of
an “ideal”, or optimal way of playing the game. In his pioneering and revolutionary
work Nash [?] formulated an equilibrium as follows: a strategy proﬁle is called
an equilibrium if the strategy of every player is a best response to other players’
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strategy. Alternatively, it is a strategy proﬁle in which no player has a positive
incentive to deviate, given the strategies of other players. Thus, we can view the
Nash equilibrium as a ﬁxed point of the best response correspondence.
Nash equilibrium is the most basic notion of an equilibrium, it expresses the idea
of “non-regretting”, i.e., none of the players is better-oﬀ deviating while other players
stick to their strategies. However, Nash equilibrium concept is a broad equilibrium
notion and appeared to be weak, for example it does not account for the possibility
of mistakes, non-credible threats etc. The reason is that the elements of a Nash
equilibrium proﬁle are best responses to themselves, so there is a problem of mu-
tual interdependence and “endogeneity”, rather than dependence on the exogenous
determinants. rather, we are looking for the solutions that are implied by the game
form itself.
The question whether there is a way to determine which strategies are enforced by
the game lead to development of numerous equilibrium reﬁnements. Stronger criteria
of equilibrium were needed in order to incorporate the possibility of mistakes and
make sure that rationality break-up on some of the stages of the game does not
throw the players away from the optimal path.
The non-optimality that arises via the unreached parts of the game was suc-
cessfully resolved by Selten [?] in 1975, who introduced the perfect equilibrium
concept as a reﬁnement of subgame perfection. The perfect equilibrium point is sta-
ble against arbitrary small deviations from rationality, which is the basic intuition
behind the satisfactory reﬁnement of subgame perfection. In order to incorporate
possibly unreahced parts of the game, Selten considered perturbed games, in which
every strategy is played with positive probability, thus eliminating the possibility of
having unreached information sets. He viewed the complete rationality as a limiting
case of incomplete rationality, and thus proposed to deﬁne the perfect equilibrium
proﬁle as a limit point of the sequence of equilibria in perturbed games. I.e,  ∗ is










Immediately the question arises whether the way incomplete rationality approaches
complete rationality inﬂuences perfectness property. That is, can  ∗ be a limit equi-
librium point for one test sequence and not be such for another sequence, both
sequences approaching the game Γ. Okada [?] gives negative answer to this ques-
tion, proving that actually not every perfect equilibrium point is stable against
arbitrary perturbation of rationality. He thus introduced the idea of strictly perfect
equilibrium point, which is limit equilibrium point for every sequence of perturbed3
games. Okada shows that if an equilibrum point is unique, or totally mixed, or
strong, then it is strictly perfect. He also demonstrates that there are games with
no perfect equilibria.
We come up with another suﬃcient condition for strict perfectness, which is the
continuity of the best response correspondence at the equilibrium point, presented as
a Theorem 3.6 in the section Results. Continuity of the best responce correspondence
is something that is implied by the game form, so we formulate our the suﬃcient
condition in terms of the primitives of the game (payoﬀs and strategies), making it
more tractable and suitable for practical usage (see Theorem 3.13).
Also, it’s not diﬃcult to show that one of the conditions listed by Okada (strong
equilibrium) implies continuity of the best response correspondence (see Lemma 3.7).
However, there are cases when none of the conditions (1) – (3) hold, while the best
responce correspondence is continuous (see Example in the Results section), which
guarantees strict perfectness. Hence, continuity is a non-trivial condition among the
suﬃcient conditions for the strict perfect equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In the section Deﬁnitions and Methodology we
present our framework and give all the necessary deﬁnition of the concepts involved.
In the section Results ﬁrst we provide some technical ﬁndings concerning the topo-
logical structure of the best responce correspondence for a perturbed game. That is,
we show how the best responce behaves when we are passing to a perturbed game
(restrict the strategy space) from the initial, or unrestricted, game (Lemmas 3.1,
3.2, 3.3, 3.4). An important result which is central for proving our main theorem
states that a best responce correspondence is continuous at the strategy proﬁle   if
and only if it is constant on some neighborhood of   (Lemma 3.5).
2. Definitions and Methodology
Deﬁnition 2.1. A normal form Γ of a ﬁnite n-player game is a tuple (Π1,⋅⋅⋅ ,Π , ),
where Π  is a ﬁnite set of pure strategies of player  , Π =
Q 
 =1 Π , and   : Π→ →ℝ 
is the payoﬀ function that assigns to every   ∈ Π the vector of payoﬀs  ( ) =
( 1( ),⋅⋅⋅ ,  ( )).
Deﬁnition 2.2. A mixed strategy    for player   is a probability distribution over
Π . The set of all such probability distributions is denoted by    ≡ Δ i, where    is
the cardinality of Π . The set of mixed strategies for the game Γ is   =
Q 
 =1   .4
We can now deﬁne an expected payoﬀ function ℎ, which is an extension of the
payoﬀ function   to all of  .




 1( ) 2( )⋅⋅⋅  ( ) ( ),
where   ( ) is the probability that   assigns to the   ℎ component of  , i.e., the
probability with which player   chooses   .
Mixed strategy    for player   is comletely mixed if    ∈ Δ 
 i. Mixed strategy   is
completely mixed if for all  ,    is completely mixed.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A best responce correspondence of player   is the correspon-
dence    :  −  =
Q
 ∕=    → →   deﬁned for each  −  ∈  −  as
  ( − ) = {˜    ∈    : ℎ (˜   , − ) ≥ ℎ (  , − ) ∀   ∈   }.
Deﬁnition 2.5. A best responce correspondence for  -person normal form
game game is the correspondence   :  → →  deﬁned for each   ∈   as a tuple
( 1( −1), 2( −2),...,  ( − )), where for each  ,   ( − ) is player  ’s best responce
correspondence deﬁned as above.
It follows by Berge’s Maximum Theorem that best responce correspondence is
upper semicontinuous, however at some points it may fail to be lower semicontinuous,
which may disrupt equilibrium stability with respect to trembles.
Deﬁnition 2.6. A perturbed game ˆ Γ of a normal form game Γ is a tuple (Γ, ),





  ≤ 1,
such that for each   ∈ {1,..., } and   ∈ {1,...,  } we have
  ( 
 
 ) ≥  
 
 ,
and for each   the following holds:
 i X
 =1
  ( 
 
 ) = 1.5
So vector   can be interpreted as a vector of minimum probabilities corresponding
to each   
  ∈ Π . A perturbed game has the property that pure strategies are ruled
out, that is the action set ˆ    for generic player   is a subset of (  )0.
The latter restriction gives rise to the notion of maximum probability of the choice
  
 . Observe that since no pure strategy can be played with zero probability, no pure
strategy can be played with probability one either.
Deﬁnition 2.7. A maximum probability of the choice   











  < 1.
From the above we get immediately the ﬁrst lemma in our results section.
Deﬁnition 2.8. A mixed strategy  ∗ ∈   is called a perfect equilibrium point
of a normal form game Γ if  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ and for some sequence
of perturbed games ˆ Γ  = (Γ,  ) with    → 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium point
   of ˆ Γ  for each   such that    →  ∗ as   → ∞.
Deﬁnition 2.9. A mixed strategy   ∈   is called a strictly perfect equilibrium
point of a normal form game Γ if  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ and for any sequence
of perturbed games ˆ Γ  = (Γ,  ) with    → 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium point
   of ˆ Γ  for each   such that    →  ∗ as   → ∞.
Notice that we can relax the assumption that  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium in Deﬁ-
nitions 2.7 and 2.8, for Selten showed that a limit of equilibrium points is itself an
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2.10. A Nash equilibrium point  ∗ ∈   is called strong if for each
player  
ℎ ( ∗) > ℎ ( ∗
− ,  ) for all    ∈    such that    ∕=  ∗
 .6
3. Results
Here we present the results regarding the implications of continuity of the best
response correspondence to the problem of stability of equilibrium points. First, we
discuss some technical results regarding the structure of a perturbed game.
Every action in a perturbed game is restricted to be played with the probability
no less than the corresponding   , that is, ∀   ∈   :  (  ) ≥   ,   ∈ {1, ... ,  }.
Combined with the restriction that the probabilities in the strategy proﬁle sum up
to one, we get immediately the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For all  , ˆ    is a unit (   − 1)-simplex with vertices:
( 1, ... ,  i−1,1 −  1 − ... −   i−1),
( 1, ... ,  i−2,1 −  1 − ... −   i−2 −   i,  i),
. . .
(1 −  2 − ... −   i, 2, ... ,  i).
Fix   ∈   and  −  ∈ ˆ  − , then   (ˆ   ) =   (ˆ   ,ˆ  − ) describes an equation of a
multidimensional plane on ˆ  − , hence the following conclusion holds.
Lemma 3.2. For all  ,   ( ˆ  − ) is an  -face of the unit (   − 1)-simplex ˆ    for
some   ∈ {0, ... ,  }.
It follows from Berge Maximum Theorem that for all  ,  −  the best response
correspondence is upper hemicontinuous in  − . However, it may fail to be lower
hemicontinuous at some points. For example, consider the 2-person game with
 1 =  2 = [0,1], and let
 2( 1) =
(
[0,1] if a1 = 0
1 otherwise.
As can be seen, the best response correspondence is not lower hemicontinuous at
 1 = 0. The fact that best response correspondence is not continuous at some points
can make the Nash equilibrium points unstable.7
Lemma 3.3. For the N-player normal form game the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(1) The best resposce correspondence   is continuous at ( 1,...,  ).
(2) For each   = 1,...,     is continuous at  − .
(3) For each   = 1,...,  there exists    open neighborhood of  −  such that   
is constant on   .
(4) There exists   open neighborhood of   such that   is constant on  .
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Assume   is continuous at  0. Let’s show upper-hemicontinuiuty
ﬁrst. Since   is continuous. it is also upper-hemicontinuous, then for every   ⊆  
neighborhood of  ( 0) there exists   ⊆   neighborhood of  0 such that   ∈  
implies  ( ) ∈  .
By Berge’s maximum theorem    is upper-hemicontinuous for each  .
For the lower-hemicontinuity of   , ﬁx    ⊆  −  open such that    ∩   ( 0
− ) ∕=
∕⃝ for each   ∈  . Let   ≡
Q 
 =1   , which meets  ( 0). Then by the lower-
hemicontinuity of   there exists   ⊆   open neighborhood of  0 such that   ∈  
implies  ( ) ∩   ∕= ∕⃝. Consequently  −  ∈  −  implies   ( − ) ∩    ∕= ∕⃝. Hence   
is lower-hemicontinuous.
(2) ⇒ (1) Assume each    is continuous at  − , then   ≡
Q 
 =1    :
Q 
 =1  − → → 
is continuous at   being a ﬁnite product of continuous compact-valued correspon-
dences. From this we can show that   is continuous at  .
Since   is upper-hemicontinuous at  , for every   open neighborhood of  ( ),
  ⊆   there exists   open neighborhood of
Q 
 =1  −  such that   ∈   ⇒  ( ) ∈  .
Hence there exists   open neighborhood of   such that   ∈   ⇒  ( ) ∈  , i.e.  
is upper-hemicontinuous at .
Due to the lower-hemicontinuity of   at  , for every   open in   s.t.   ∩
 (
Q 
 =1  − ) ∕= ∕⃝ there exists   open neighborhood of
Q 
 =1  −  such that   ∈
  ⇒  ( ) ∩   ∕= ∕⃝. Hence there exists   open neighborhood of   such that
  ∈   ⇒  ( ) ∩   ∕= ∕⃝. Therefore   is lower-hemicontinuous at  .
(2) ⇒ (3) Fix   ∈  . Assume   ( 0
− ) is continuous at  0
− . need to show there
exists an open neighborhood of  0
−  such that    is constant on that neighborhood.
Suppose by contradiction for each    open neighborhood of  0
−     is not constant
on   . WLOG   ( 0
− ) is an M-face   of the unit   -simplex   . Hence there exists
  open neighborhood of   that does not contain any other face of the unit   -
simplex, or an open set that meets  , but does not meet any other face of   .8
Apply upper-hemicontinuity of    in the ﬁrst case, and lower-hemicontinuity of   
in the second case to derive contradiction:
1) there does not exist   open neighborhood of  0
−  such that   ∈   implies
  ( ) ∈  ;
2) there does not exist   open neighborhood of  0
−  such that   ∈   implies
  ( ) ∩   ∕⃝.
Both cases imply that    is not continuous at  0
− , contradiction.
(3) ⇒ (2) is obvious, and equivalence of (3) and (4) is immediate, which ﬁnishes
the proof.
Lemma 3.4. For every   ∈   the corresponding faces of    and ˆ    are collinear,
when we consider    and ˆ    to be subsets of the vector space ℝ i.
Lemma 3.5. For every   ∈   if   ( − ) is an  -face of the unit (   − 1)-simplex
  , then ˆ   ( ˆ  − ) is the corresponding  -face of the unit (   − 1)-simplex ˆ   .
The above lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 0.5 and the fact that
for every player, keeping the strategies of all other players ﬁxed, his payoﬀ function
is a linear in probabilities constituting that player’s mixed strategy.
Theorem 3.6. Let  0 ∈   be a Nash equilibrium for the normal form game Γ with
  players. If for every   = 1,...,     :  − → →   is continuous at  0
− , then  0 is
strictly perfect equilibrium point.
Proof. Claim: ∀  > 0 ∃ ¯   = (¯   ) 
 =1 such that for every ˆ   ≥ ¯   the corresponding
perturbed game ˆ Γ has a Nash equilibrium ˆ   such that ∥ ˆ   −  0∥ ≤  .
Since ∀    :  − → →   is continuous at  0
− , then by Lemma 0.4 ∀  there exists  − 
open neighborhood of  0
−  such that    is constant on  − . Let   =
T 
 =1 (   ×  − ),
then for every   the best response correspondence    is constant on  − , also   is
an open neighborhood of  0 since all  − ’s are.
WLOG  0 ∈  1 × ... ×    ⊆  , where    is an open (in   ) box around  0
 .
Therefore    is constant on  −  for every  .9
Fix   > 0. Let   > 0 be such that  -neighborhood of  0 in   in uniform topology
is in   (we are able to do it since   is open and  0 ∈   ). Let   ′ denote the
 ′-neighborhood of  0 (in the uniform topology), and deﬁne    =    ∩   ′
  . Then
∀  ∀ −  ∈  −  :   ( − ) =   ( 0
− ).
Let  ′ = min{ , } > 0. Compose ¯   = (¯   ) 
 =1 as follows: for each  , if  0
  is
interior, then ¯    is arbitrary, otherwise ¯    is such that the corresponding ˆ    meets
  . We claim that for every   ≥ ¯   the corresponding perturbed game ˆ Γ has a Nash
equilibrium ˆ   such that ∥ ˆ   −  0∥ ≤  ′ (and consequently ∥ ˆ   −  0∥ ≤  ).
Indeed, ﬁx ˆ   ≥ ¯  , and let    denote the best responce of player   to  0
− , which
is an   -face of the unit   -simplex. Then for the perturbed game corresponding to
ˆ   the best responce of player   is also the   -face, call it ˆ   .
For each  , consider    = ˆ    ∩   . We claim that any point in ∩ 
 =1   is a Nash
equilibrium of the perturbed game ˆ Γ. Indeed, for every    ∈       is a best responce,
so any point in   is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3.7. If  0 ∈   is a strong equilibrium point, then    is continuous at  0
− 
for every   = 1,..., .
Proof. Since  0 is a strong equilibrium point,    is a singleton for every  . By
the properties of best response correspondence    is upper hemicontinuous, so for
every  ,    is a singleton on some neighborhood of  0
− . Hence by Lemma 0.4,    is
continuous at  0
−  for every   = 1,..., .
So, strong equilibrium implies continuity of the best responces at that point, how-
ever the converse is not true. Also, there are examples (e.g., Matching pennies game)
when the equilibrium point is unique and interior, but the best responces fail to be
continuous at that equilibrium point. The following example shows that the continu-
ity condition is essential in the sense that for certainn equilibrium points none of the
three suﬃcient conditions provided by Okada hold, however the best response corre-
spondence is continuous, which implies strict perfectness of the equilibrium point.
Example 3.8. (Essentiality of the continuity condition) Consider the two-
person normal form game depicted in the table below. In this example equilibrium
point ( , ) is neither interior nor unique, for ( , ) and ( , ) are Nash equilibria
as well. It is also not strong equilibrium, however the best responce correspondence
is continuous at ( , ).10
1/2 a b
A 1, 4 1, 0
B 1, 4 1, 0
C 0, 1 1, 1
Example 3.9. Consider the 2-person game with player 1 having choices 1,2,..., ,
and player 2 having   choices. If player 1 randomizes between his choices according
to the vector of probabilities   = ( 1,...,  ), and player 2 uses the strategy   =








  (  1 1 + ... +      ),
where (   )
 =1,..., 
 =1,...,  and (   )
 =1,..., 
 =1,...,  are the payoﬀ matrices for players 1 and 2,
respectively.
Denote   1 1 + ... +       by  1
 , and   1 1 + ... +       by  2





   
1
 ,  2 =
  X
 =1
   
2
 .
Player 1, given the strategy   of another player, optimezes w.r.t.  , given a
constant vector  1 = ( 1
1,..., 1
 ), which is completely determined by  . A version of
Lemma 3.2 ensures that the best responce  ∗( 1) is a face of the unit simplex Δ .
Example 3.10. Now consider the 3-person game with players 1, 2 and 3 having
 ,   and   choices, respectively, using the mixed strategies   = ( 1,...,  ),   =
( 1,...,  ), and   = ( 1,...,  ). Then player 1’s utility can be written (similarly









        ) =
  X
 =1








 =1         .11
The above examples make obvious the generalization to the  -player case. Every
player   is maximizing the utility function that is linear in his own proabilities,
taking the vector    as given.
Deﬁnition 3.11. Given a vector   = ( 1,...,  ), an order of   is a vector of
integers   = ( 1,...,  ) such that for each  ,    is a rank of    among { 1,...,  }
(assuming that max ∈{1,..., }    has the rank 1).
Lemma 3.12. Consider player  ’s utility function written in the form    =
P 
 =1     
 ,
where   is the strategy of player   and    is a function of other players’ strategies.
Then the best responce correspondence   ( − ) is constant in the neighborhood   of
some  0
−  if and only if the order of    is constant on that neighborhood.
Notice that we allow  0
−  to be on the boundary of  − , in this case the neighbor-
hood of  0
−  is open in the relative topology with respect to  − . Combined with
Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.6, this gives a suﬃcient condition for strict perfectness
of a Nash equilibrium point, which is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.13. Let  ∗ ∈   be a Nash equilibrium for the normal form game Γ with
  players. If there exists a neighborhhood   =
Q 
 =1    of  ∗ such that for every
  = 1,...,  the order of    is constant on  − , then  ∗ is strictly perfect equilibrium
point.
Finally, the following theorem demonstrates that continunity is a regular condition
in the sense that the best responce ocrrespondence is continuous almost everywhere
(with respect to the Lebesgue measure on  ).
Theorem 3.14. The best responce correspondence for any ﬁnite normal form game
Γ is continuous almost everywhere.
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